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Abstract: In current cloud services hosting solutions, various mechanisms have been developed to minimize the 
possibility of hosting staff from breaching security. However, while functions such as replicating and moving machines are 
legitimate actions in clouds, we show that there are risks in administrators being able to perform them.  We describe three 
threat scenarios related to hosting staff on the cloud architecture and indicate how an appropriate accountability architecture 
can mitigate these risks in the sense that the attacks can be detected and the perpetrators identified. We identify 
requirements and future research and development needed to protect cloud service environments from these attacks.
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few years, cloud computing has grown 
from being a promising business to one of the fastest 
growing segments of the IT industry (Gartner, 2009) 
because businesses can now gain access to the latest 
concept and best business applications while, in 
most cases, minimising the cost of 
hardware/infrastructure. This is achieved by a client 
of a cloud services provider being able to share 
computer platforms, networking and storage 
infrastructure with the provider’s other clients.  
     However, the downside of this arrangement is 
that the onus is on the cloud service provider, not the 
client, to ensure that the particular client’s 
confidential company information is kept 
appropriately separated and secure, and to take 
measures to protect that client’s company 
information from malicious software and processes 
that may be initiated on any of the cloud’s virtual 
machines. Consequently, there is a significant, and 
growing, level of concern about the cloud and its 
security (Ristenpart et al. 2009).  
     One of the security issues which became evident 
in outsourcing business models, and which is now 
seen in the cloud services environment, is the trust 
of staff (Cattedu et al., 2009). In current hosting 
solutions, various mechanisms have been developed 
to minimize the possibility of hosting staff from 
breaching security such as physical separation and 
logging and audit controls. However, while 
functions such as replicating and moving machines 
(often done to optimize operations and efficiencies) 
are legitimate actions in clouds, we shall show that 
there are risks in administrators being able to 
perform them, including the potential to: 
  
 impersonate clients, 
 expose confidential data, 
 corrupt data, and 
 make fraudulent transactions. 
  
     In this paper, we describe three attacks on the 
virtual machine layer of a typical cloud services 
architecture which can be perpetrated by hosting 
staff, resulting in all of the above risks being 
effected.  
     We describe requirements on the cloud 
architecture which allow partial mitigation of the 
above risks in the sense that the attacks can be 
detected and the perpetrators identified. These 
requirements include logging of access events, staff 
profiling and machine profiling. While some of 
these requirements are not yet in use in cloud service 
environments, we believe that research and 
 development over the near future will enable the 
gaps to be filled. 
     In the next section we discuss current work in 
this area. In Section 3, we describe our attacks 
scenarios. In Section 4 we analyze these scenarios 
and describe how they can be mitigated. In Section 
5, we conclude and propose further work. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Cloud service systems are dynamic and require 
organizational collaboration across many sectors, 
including business services, administration and 
technical services. Thus, predefined business logic 
and service level agreements are normally in place 
to enable smooth business processing. This, in itself, 
is not sufficient to ensure that the environment can 
be completely trusted. Violations can occur. As 
pointed out in (Yao et al. 2010), the ability to detect 
violations is a critical component of developing a 
trusted computing environment. They argue that this 
ability requires a separation of activities and 
evidence logging into different domains which they 
call the ‘business service domains’ and the 
‘accountability domains’ respectively. This is now a 
commonly accepted approach to cloud architecture 
(Yao et al. 2010), (Popa et al. 2010).  
     Yao et al. argue that the purpose of accountability 
is ‘binding each activity to the identity of its actor’ 
and thus demonstrate a method which is shown to do 
this for a loan-service scenario implemented on the 
Amazon Elastic Compute cloud 
(http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/).  
 
     Dalton and colleagues in (Dalton et al., 2009) 
argue that reducing the size and complexity of the 
code which needs to be trusted is the best approach 
to providing security and trustworthiness. Figure 1 
provides a standard description of the use of a 
hypervisor in a virtual machine environment. The 
hypervisor is a layer of software that sits between 
hardware and higher-level software structures such 
as applications, and decides which of them gets how 
much access to memory, storage and CPU time. In 
the top of the figure, several virtual machines, 
software versions of PCs, are available for use by 
customers, as in for instance an online shop. The 
chassis supplies the power to the blade server which 
has its own CPU, memory and hard disk. In (Dalton 
et al., 2009), the authors disaggregate the hypervisor, 
identifying ‘the security critical features of the 
platform and moving them into separate and smaller 
restricted privilege domains’ and develop in the 
paper an architecture around an interface with the 
disaggregated hypervisor (see Figure 3 of their 
paper). The authors claim that this new architecture, 
along with a trusted platform module allows for 
better integrity measurement and reporting, though 
they do not report on any experimental work. 
 
     In work of Corney, Mohay, Clark and Lopes 
(Corney et al, 2011) prototype software was 
developed which identifies anomalous events in a 
computing environment based on usage patterns and 
user profiles. The authors are able to detect 
unauthorized use of software by users in an 
organization. They do this by building a user profile 
for each user and detecting departures from the 
routine. At this point, their work is based on the 
presence or absence of a particular application in a 
user’s file, but they plan to extend the work to build 
probabilistic models. In Section 5, we indicate how 
this type of profiling can be a solution to stopping 
the attacks with which we deal in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 THE ATTACK SCENARIOS 
We consider the hardware set-up of the virtual 
machine environment. Figure 1 presents this in 
detail. A number of virtual machines run off a 
hypervisor supported by the blade and chassis. Data 
gathered from the virtual machine is sent to the 
storage area once it has been processed.  
 
     We assume, as in (Yao et al. 2010), that the 
Business Services Domain is separated logically 
 from the Accountability Domain and that no staff in 
either domain are able to perform the functions of 
the staff in the other domain. 
   The following three sub-sections describe attacks 
on this set-up. 
 
3.1 Unauthorized activities 
A cloud staff member may abuse the privilege of 
accessing the storage area and gain access to 
information which is an abuse of their privilege 
status.  This individual may also run unauthorized 
software or applications on machines in the Business 
Services Domain. We describe in Section 5 how the 
cloud architecture can detect these abuses and 
identify the individual. 
 
3.2 VM Machine Copying 
In order to handle peak demands on the system, it is 
standard practice to make copies of virtual machines 
in order to deal with the excessive traffic. For 
example, an on-line shop may experience a peak in 
business during lunch-time hours from Monday to 
Friday. A copy of the shop can be made to deal with 
the peak hours and then closed down when no longer 
needed. 
     A business service staff member therefore, 
legitimately, has both the ability and right to 
establish a copy of a virtual machine, as shown in 
Figure 1. The copied virtual machine has the same 
capability and data as the original and can be used to 
impersonate clients, fraudulently purchase goods 
using customer credit card information, corrupt 
credit card information with the aim of denying a 
customer the opportunity to purchase, for example, 
or gather credit card information for the purposes of 
selling it.  
3.3 A Rogue VMware Machine 
A cloud staff member may be authorized to replace a 
mal-functioning machine, but may introduce a rogue 
machine to the stack, substituting it for a legitimate 
machine. This machine may then access the storage 
and steal or corrupt customer data. It may carry 
malware which can infiltrate the hypervisor and so 
the other virtual machines in the stack, stealing or 
corrupting data, playing havoc with the network and 
connections and business processes. 
 
     We argue that the Accountability Domain must 
be able to deal with these situations in a number of 
ways. 
 
1. It must be able to detect these violations. 
2. It must be able to determine the exact time at 
which the violation occurred. 
3. It must be able to determine which staff were 
responsible. 
4. It must be able to differentiate between the 
scenarios 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
In the next section, we analyze these attack scenarios 
and determine the information needed by the 
accountability domain in order to provide answers to 
the above questions.  
4 PROVIDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
In this section we develop the framework for an 
Accountability Architecture which will, amongst 
other things, be able to successfully complete the 
four tasks delineated in Section 3.2.  In doing so, we 
draw on work of other authors as well as introducing 
some novel components. 
     We first define some of the terms we shall use in 
this section.  
 
Definition.  An ‘event’ is an action initiated either 
by the user or the computer. An example of a user 
event is a keystroke. An example of a computer 
generated event is a notification based on the time of 
day 
Definition.  An ‘enactor’ is the entity generating an 
event. This might be a computer or a user. 
 
4.1 Binding Events to Enactors 
Following Yao et al., we stipulate that each event is 
bound to its enactor.  This is done in the Business 
Services Domain by administrative means.  There is 
a set list of events (with associated times) available 
for execution.  Staff members are assigned to enact 
these events at specific times.  
 
When staff member S enacts event E, for 
example instantiating or copying a virtual machine, 
she signs a set of input parameters to the event and a 
set of output parameters from the event with her 
private key from the company’s public key scheme.  
These are then lodged with the Accountability 
Domain which can verify the enactor by means of 
her public key which produces information 
connected to the event. 
  For actions, such as loading software onto 
virtual machines, or reconfiguring the environment, 
change management processes and approval 
structures should be in place to provide further 
accountability for these actions. 
4.2 Logging of Events 
Each event is automatically logged by the 
Accountability Division along with the identity of 
the enactor in the form of the two signed data-
strings, and the time the signing occurred.  At the 
time of logging, the identity of the enactor is 
confirmed and also logged in the Accountability 
Domain. 
 
     We note that ensuring the integrity of the logs 
themselves has been considered by several people. 
For example, (Schneier et al., 1999) use hash chains 
to ensure that logs cannot be tampered with. 
 
4.3 Staff Profiling 
Here, we introduce a methodology based on ideas in 
(Corney et al. 2010).  The Accountability Domain 
starts to build a profile of each staff member in the 
Business Services Domain as of their date of 
appointment.  All events enacted by each staff 
member are logged in the profile.  Each profile is 
then regularly checked for anomalies and this 
process should be automated in some reliable 
fashion.  Nevertheless, the amount of data needing 
to be checked can grow quickly into quantities that 
distract from the core business.  This can be 
managed very well by means of a sliding window 
approach, as demonstrated in (Corney et al. 2010).  
In this method, while all data in the profile is stored, 
only the last n hours are checked on a regular basis.  
The number, n, of hours chosen may be a function of 
level of access assigned to the staff member, level of 
confidentiality of data accessed during the event, or 
any subset of a number of additional items.  We 
assume that for each staff member S, the number nS 
of hours checked on a regular basis is pre-
determined jointly by the administration of the 
Business Services Division and the Accountability 
Division.  The number nS may change from time to 
time relative to the same staff member S and 
depending on changes in the role and responsibilities 
of S. 
 
4.4 An Accountability Architecture 
We now combine the components discussed in 
Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 into an accountability 
architecture which is exhibited in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
      
 
     In Figure 2, the enactor and event are represented 
as being bound by means of the private key of the 
enactor which signs the event.  The event is logged 
and, at the same time, the fact that the enactor 
performed the event is recorded in her profile. 
5 DEALING WITH THE ATTACK 
SCENARIOS 
We now explain how the Services Accountability 
Architecture, introduced in the previous section, can 
deal with the situations posed in Section 3. 
5.1 Detecting Unauthorized Activities 
As discussed in Section 4, the practice of logging the 
actions of privileged users is necessary to provide 
accountability for staff. While standard logging 
procedures may be in place, the diagnostics of such 
logs in this environment need development in order 
to deal with mass production and to deal with 
dynamic features of virtual machines. To our 
knowledge, there is no current research on the most 
appropriate or the most accurate diagnostic methods 
in such an environment; nor is there any indication 
that diagnostic methods used in past service provider 
environments are appropriate for cloud services.  
 However, once such research has been 
accomplished, the Accountability Domain will be 
able to examine the activities of all virtual machines 
and correlate them to determine which were 
unauthorized and when they occurred, as well as 
which staff were involved. On the other hand, we 
note in the next two sub-sections some problems 
which need to be understood when developing log 
Business Services Domain       Accountability Domain 
Enactor 
Event 
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Figure 2.  Accountability architecture 
 diagnostics to determine the time and the staff 
member responsible. 
 
5.2 Determining the Exact Time of a 
 Violation 
Consider the situation where a virtual machine is 
shut down under certain conditions; this may include 
the case where the number of requests falls below a 
certain threshold for example. Precise conditions 
such as these would be established in the working 
environment.  However, if a staff member uses a 
machine as a false copy of a legitimate machine, 
request rates may remain high enough to maintain 
machine operation. In such a situation, technically, a 
violation occurred at the time at which the flow of 
legitimate requests fell below the pre-determined 
threshold. But the system cannot distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate requests; it is 
only at the time that the machine is discovered to be 
a copy that the system logs will be invoked to 
determine when the copy was made.   
5.3 Determining the Staff member 
Responsible 
Once the time of a violation has been determined, 
the profiles of all staff on duty at that time can be 
examined.  Events logged at that time identify the 
staff member or members associated with the event 
by means of the private key used.  The events related 
to the violation then indicate which staff were 
involved. 
5.4 Differentiating between Violations  
  3.2 and 3.3 
Unauthorized actions, such as accessing storage, will 
either come from a virtual machine in the 
environment or from a management console. Access 
from management consoles and virtual machines is 
logged and so detectable by examination of the logs. 
Other types of attacks may come from virtual 
machines however, and their detection relies on 
suitable logging actions. Machine copying, for 
example, can be detected if the machine acts in an 
unusual way. A machine profile is an appropriate 
method of detecting a copy, since a machine which 
has been functioning in the cloud service 
environment performs particular, specified tasks 
(such as those relevant to an online shop) and its 
operation follows a regular pattern over a particular 
block of time (one day or one week for example). A 
copy of such a machine is expected to follow the 
same pattern. Any departure from such a pattern 
would be suspicious.  
A rogue machine introduced as a new piece of 
hardware as described in Section 3.3, would not 
have established a usable profile with which to 
compare behaviour. However, unlike the situation of 
a copied machine, which would try to remain 
undetected, a rogue machine would have negative 
impact on other machines in its environment. In this 
case, it is the profiles of the affected machines that 
would detect anomalies, and the collection of these 
anomalies would point to a rogue machine.  
 
In summary, appropriate logging methods in 
conjunction with staff and machine profiles enable 
the cloud service provider to deal with any of the 
attacks discussed in this paper, either individually or 
combined.  Methods of ensuring tamper-proof logs 
as in (Kelsey et al. 1999) can be extended to 
ensuring that profiles are also tamper-proof.  
6 FUTURE WORK 
Simulation of authorized and unauthorized activities 
in large production domains will provide direction 
for the development of efficient and accurate log-
based diagnostics in cloud environments. 
     The establishment of profiles for individual staff 
members is extremely useful in identifying 
anomalies in the individual’s behaviour which may 
be indicative of suspicious behaviour. Such profiling 
can be extended to sections of the cloud operation 
such as a particular business process or a particular 
machine or cluster of machines in order to detect a 
situation which may indicate malicious behaviour. 
Future work in this area might include the use of 
techniques currently used to detect a denial-of-
service attack on a server from outside the firewall. 
The gathering of data in an on-going automated 
way for potential forensic use is a second area of 
research which is worthwhile pursuing. This would 
have to be done in such a way that the rights and 
privacy of staff members were not violated (with 
respect to all relevant laws) and also such that data 
was gathered efficiently and in a manner that was 
easy to access and use when needed. 
The ability of a cloud customer to detect the 
failure of conditions in the service level agreement 
would be a useful addition to assurance of data 
integrity. This idea has been proposed in several 
publications, for instance, in (Simmhan, 2010) and it 
 is an area of interest for further work by the present 
authors. 
 
7  REFERENCES 
Cattedu, D. and Hogben, G., editors. ‘Cloud computing
 security benefits, risks and recommendations’, 
 Nov. 2009 – Report by the European Network and  
 Information Security Agency. 
Corney, M., Mohay, G., Clark, A., R., Lopes, J. 2011. 
Detection of anomalies from user profiles generated 
from system logs. In Proceedings of AISC; to appear. 
Dalton, C., Plaquin, D., Weidner, W., Kuhlmann, D., 
Balacheff, B. and Brown, R. 2009. Trusted virtual 
platforms: A key enabler for converged client devices. 
In ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol.43, 
36-43. 
Gartner Inc. ‘How cloud computing will change business’ 
in 
www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/09_2
4/b4135042942270.htm 
Popa, R., Lorch, J., Molnar, D., Wang, H., Zhuang, L. 
2010. Enabling security in cloud storage SLAs with 
CloudProof. Microsoft report available at 
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/131137/cloudproof
-msr-tr.pdf  
Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. 
(2009). Hey, You, Get off of my Cloud:   
Exploring Information Leakage in Third 
Schneier, B., Kelsey, J. 1999. Secure audit logs to support 
computer forensics. In ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security, 2, 159-176. 
Simmhan, Y. and Gomadam, K. 2010. Social web-scale 
provenence in the cloud. In proceedings of IPAW 
2010, LNCS vol. 6378, pp 298-300. 
Yao, J., Chen, S., Wang, C., Levy, D. Zic, J. 2010. 
Accountability as a service for the cloud. Proceedings 
of IEEE International Conference on Services 
Computing, IEEE Computer Society, 81-88. 
  
